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I INTRODUCTION 
A closely held business has a range of business associations to chose from when 
considering an operating vehicle for its operations. In exercising this choice 
participants of closely held businesses have two main concerns. They wish to avoid 
costly and unnecessary procedural regulation by Statute, and they wish to limit their 
personal liability. 
A relatively new business association in the United States called the Limited Liability 
Company has been developed which meets these concerns of closely held businesses. 
The limited liability company, more commonly known as a LLC, does so by combining 
the operational flexibility of a partnership with the limited personal liability of a 
corporation. This development has been tax driven, the adoption of a partnership-like 
structure being in an effort to avoid characterisation as a corporation for federal tax 
purposes.1 
There is no equivalent LLC legislation in New Zealand. In New Zealand participants in 
closely held businesses must incorporate under the Companies Act 1993 to achieve 
limited personal liability. This paper compares the efficacy of the Companies Act in 
meeting the particular concerns of closely held businesses with that of the LLC. After 
a brief history part III outlines the general features of the LLC. Part IV undertakes a 
1 In the US a business association may be taxed as a corporation if it possesses certain corporate 
characteristics, in particular continuity of life, free transferability of interests. centralised 
management, and limited liability. Having adopted limited liability states avoided the other three 
characteristics to try and ensure the benefits of taxation as a pass through entity (ie members are 
taxed directly on business profits - there is no taxation at the entity level). In New Zealand taxation is 
not a major concern. The qualifying company regime enables companies with five or fewer 
shareholders to qualify for taxation as a pass through entity. See Dr S Glazebrook 'The Qualifying 
Company Regime" (1992) New Zealand Law Society Seminar for a discussion of qualifying 
companies. 
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comparative transactional analysis of the Companies Act 1993 and the Wyoming LLC, 
drawing conclusions as to their commercial practicability for closely held businesses. 
II HISTORY OF THE LLC 
The first LLC Act was passed in Wyoming in 1977 as special interest legislation for an 
oil company. Florida followed with its own Act in 1982. But it was not until 
uncertainty about the federal tax treatment of an LLC was finally clarified in 1988 that 
other states began to seriously consider enacting their own LLC Acts. 2 In a rush to 
attract investment all states have, since 1990, either adopted or are considering their 
own LLC legislation. 
The original Wyoming Act served as the basis for many of the early LLC Acts . 
However, State LLC legislation has become increasingly diversified. States have 
largely mixed and matched provisions of preceding LLC Acts, combining them with 
variations drawn from their own state corporation and partnership laws as well as the 
Uniform Partnership Act, the Uniform Limited Partnership Act, the Revised Uniform 
Limited Partnership Act, the Model Business Corporation Act, and the Revised Model 
Business Corporation Act. 
In late 1994, in response to the increasing diversity in state LLC legislation, the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws finally approved and 
recommended for enactment in all states a Uniform Limited Liability Company Act 
(ULLCA). The ULLCA will serve to guide states towards much needed cohesion and 
' uniformity' in LLC legislation. 
2 In Revenue Ruling 88-76 the United States Inland Revenue Service stated that limited liability 
wouldn 't of itself preclude the treatment of the LLC as a 'pass through ' entity for tax purposes. 
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III GENERAL LLC STRUCTURE 
States have taken differing approaches to legislating for LLCs. Some like Wyoming 
have taken a minimalist approach, providing only the most rudimentary basics of 
regulation. Other states, for example Colorado, have provided more default procedural 
guidance. All states, to varying degrees, have placed a premium on freedom of 
contract, leaving members with considerable freedom to regulate their own affairs in 
an 'operating agreement', with most Acts containing few non-displaceable rules . The 
Delaware Act expressly states as a policy objective the aim to give maximum effect to 
this principle3. 
The ULLCA follows those states that have provided a set default provisions to govern 
LLC operations. In drafting the Act the Drafting Committee was guided by a single 
policy vision, "... to draft a flexible act with a comprehensive set of default rules 
designed to substitute as the essence of the bargain for small entrepreneurs and 
others."4 
Despite the current diversity of state LLC legislation a general LLC structure is 
discernible. This structure is outlined below with particular reference to the Colorado, 
Delaware, Idaho, and Wyoming Acts, as well as the ULLCA. 
A Nature of the LLC 
The LLC is a legal entity distinct from its members, who are not liable for LLC debts 
or obligations. The LLC can sue and be sued, it can hold property and it has all the 
powers to carry on business in its own name. However, unlike a corporation there is 
no requirement for separation of ownership and control in a board of directors . 
3 Delaware LLC Act art 18-1 IOl(b). 
4 ULLCA prefatory note, page 2. 
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Members have a choice to manage the LLC directly themselves or to vest management 
in appointed managers. 
B Organisational Formalities 
Members of a LLC must file articles of organisation with the relevant state authority 
and await the issue of a certificate of organisation, which serves as evidence that the 
LLC is legally formed . The required contents of the articles of organisation vary 
among states but typically include the LLC name, the name and address of its 
registered agent for service of process, its term of duration, the names and addresses 
of original organisers, and a vesting statement if management is to be vested in 
managers . 
Most states, and the ULLCA, permit single member LLCs. Wyoming still requires at 
least two . Members are generally free to determine the duration of the LLC, either for 
a fixed period determinable by an event or date, or perpetuity. Some states impose a 
default limit, commonly 30 years, for example Wyoming. 
C Management 
In default LLC management is vested in members in proportion either to their capital 
contributions, or their interest in LLC profits, or on a per capita basis, depending on 
the state. Members may vest management in professional managers ( or particular 
members) provided it is pursuant to a vesting statement contained in the articles of 
organisation. 
Whether management is retained by the members or is vested in managers, members 
are able to contract for their own regulation of internal affairs in an operating 
agreement, which may usually be written or oral. Any restrictions imposed on the 
scope of the operating agreement vary between states but are generally limited to 
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unreasonably restricting a members right of access to LLC information, or eliminating 
or unreasonably restricting any general duties of care and loyalty imposed between 
members, managers and the LLC. The requirement of the ULLCA under article 403 
that certain actions only be undertaken with the unanimous consent of members is 
itself subject to the operating agreement by virtue of article 103 . Written operating 
agreements may be required by some states for certain actions. 
5 
Management action 1s free of the recurrent documentation and certification 
requirements found in the Companies Act 1993, as well as the extensive procedural 
regulation. Those States that do require the LLC to keep certain records typically limit 
those records to names and addresses of managers, copies of the articles of 
organisation and any written operating agreements, copies of any financial statements 
of the LLC, and statements detailing the agreed value and nature of members' 
contributions. But often even these minimal requirements may be negated by members 
in an operating agreement. 6 
This lack of documentary and procedural formality reflects the often informal nature of 
a closely held business. The greater convergence of ownership and control makes such 
requirements, designed to ensure the accountability of management to shareholders, 
unnecessary and simply a source of increased transaction costs and liability exposure 
for managers. The permission by many states, as well as the ULLCA, of oral operating 
agreements also reflects the probable informal nature of a closely held business. 
I Distributions 
The freedom of members to regulate their own affairs in an operating agreement is 
necessarily tempered in some circumstances in the interests of creditors. As members 
enjoy limited personal liability creditors will be concerned to ensure that LLC value is 
5 For example see art 7-80-108 of the Colorado LLC Act. 
6 For example see art 53-625 of the Idaho LLC Act. 
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not diminished by excessive distributions. Distributions pose a particularly large risk to 
creditors of closely held businesses given the tendency of members to use the business 
as a 'private bank' to meet their liquidity needs. Non-displaceable prov1s10ns 
providing capital maintenance rules are therefore warranted. 
The circumstances and terms of distributions to members of cash or other assets, or 
profits are left to members to determine in an operating agreement, subject to the 
applicable capital maintenance rules. In default any allocation may be proportional to 
received contributions 7, or on a per capita basis. 8 
Often the legislation contains no definition of a distribution. The ULLCA defines a 
distribution as a "transfer of money, property, or other benefit from a limited liability 
company to a member in the member's capacity as a member or to a transferee of the 
members distributional interest. "9 
The applicable capital maintenance rules often require the 'fair' value of LLC assets to 
exceed its liabilities (excluding the members' contributions) before any distribution can 
be made. 10 Members who knowingly receive a distribution in breach of the capital 
maintenance rule are typically liable for the amount of wrongful distribution. The 
ULLCA's capital maintenance rule adds a trading limb and is more akin to the two 
limbed solvency test under the Companies Act. 11 
7 As is the case in Delaware and Wyoming. 
8 As is the case for Idaho and the ULLCA. 
9 ULLCA s 101(5). 
1° For example art 7-80-606 of the Colorado LLC Act provides that: 
A member may not receive a distribution from a limited liability company to the extent that, after giving 
effect to the distribution, all liabilities of the limited liability company, other than liabilities to members on 
account of their membership interests, would exceed the fair value of the limited liability company assets. 
11 Contrast the Companies Act solvency test under s 4 with that under s 406(a) of the ULLCA, which 
provides: 
A distribution may not be made if: 
( 1) the limited liability company \\Ould not be able to pay its debts as they become due in the ordinary 
course of business; or 
8 
A 'fair' basis to valuations recognises that due to the size and informal nature a closely 
held business it is unlikely to incur the expense of maintaining financial records 
prepared by professionals. The ULLCA goes further by providing that any valuations 
required for its solvency test may also be made on any other method that is reasonable 
in the circumstances. 12 
Once a member becomes entitled to a distribution normally that member will expressly 
acquire the status of, and be entitled to all remedies available to, a creditor of the LLC 
with respect to the distribution. 
2 General duties of managers and members 
What duties should be owed by managers and members of a LLC, and to what extent 
these duties should be displaceable is a controversial and difficult issue13 . Not all states 
have attempted to codify these duties, and those that have have adopted differing 
standards and have placed varying limits on displaceability, whether that displaceablity 
is direct or by way of indemnification of members and managers . 
Colorado, for example, requires managers to perform their duties in good faith, in a 
manner that they reasonably believe to be in the best interests of the LLC, and with 
such care as an ordinarily prudent person in a like position would use under similar 
(2) the company' s total assets would be less than the sum of its total liabilities plus the amount that would 
be needed, if the company \Vere to be dissolved, \,otmd up, and tenninated at tl1e time of distribution, to 
satisfy the preferential rights upon dissolution, winding up, an termination of members \\ hose preferential 
rights are superior to t110se receiving the distribution. 
12 ULLCA s 406(b) . 
13 See S.K.Miller ··what Standards of Conduct Should Apply to Members and Managers of Limited 
Liability Companies?" 68 St. John 's L.Rev. The opposing rationales of freedom of contact and 
mandatory rules, with respect to indemnification. are discussed in Part IV of this paper. 
9 
circumstances. 14 In doing so managers may rely on the reports, op1mons and 
statements of certain experts and employees that they reasonably believe to be reliable 
and competent in the relative matters, unless they have knowledge that that reliance is 
unwarranted. Article 7-80-108 prohibits the operating agreement from unreasonably 
reducing the duty of care or eliminating the good faith obligation ( although parties 
may determine reasonable standards for the measure of that obligation). The LLC is 
free to seek insurance cover for managers under art 7-80-410. 
In contrast to Colorado's duty of care the Idaho Act only imposes liability for gross 
negligence or wilful misconduct, unless the operating agreement specifies a higher 
standard.15 The duty against unauthorised self-dealing under art 53-622(2) is 
displaceable by the operating agreement. The duties don 't apply to members who 
aren't managers in a manager managed LLC and are simply acting in their capacity of 
a member. 16 Under art 53-624 the operating agreement may limit or eliminate the 
personal liability of a member or manager for monetary damages for breach of any 
duty in art 53-622, and may indemnify a member or manager for any judgments, 
settlements, penalties, fines or expenses incurred in a proceeding to which a person is 
party because the person was a member or manager. 
Delaware gives complete freedom of contract to the members. Under art 18-108 the 
LLC has the power to indemnify and hold harmless any member or manager or other 
person from and against any and all claims and demands whatsoever. To complement 
this provision article 18-1101 ( c) provides for the restriction of duties owed at law or 
equity by the operating agreement. Article 18-406 provides for reliance on reports and 
information by a member or manager. 
14 Colorado LLC Act art 7-8-406(1). 
15 Idaho LLC Act art 53-622. 
16 Idaho LLC Act art 53-622(3) . 
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The ULLCA provides for a duty of loyalty and a duty of care owed by the LLC 
management, whether by members or managers, to the LLC and members. The duty of 
care is limited to refraining from engaging in grossly negligent or reckless conduct, 
intentional misconduct, or a knowing violation of law. The duty of loyalty includes 
refraining from acting in competition with the LLC, and holding as trustee any 
property, benefit or profit derived from a use of the LLC's property, including the 
appropriation of a company' s opportunity. Any operating agreement may not 
unreasonably reduce the duty of care, and it may not eliminate the duty of loyalty, 
although it may identify categories of activities that do not violate it, if not manifestly 
unreasonable.17 
D Derivative Actions 
Some states include provision for derivative actions. For example Delaware entitles a 
member to bring a derivative action on behalf of LLC if members or managers with 
authority to do so have or are likely to refuse to bring the action themselves. The 
plaintiff must be a member at the time of the transaction or have received their 
membership interest from a person who was, and must set out efforts to secure 
initiation of the action by members or managers, or reasons for not doing so. If the 
derivative action is successful the court may award plaintiff reasonable expenses. 18 The 
ULLCA also codifies a right of derivative action, adopting the Delaware provisions 
almost verbatim. 19 
1
" ULLCA ss 103 and 409. 
18 Delaware LLC Act ss 18-1001 to 18-1004. 
19 ULLCA ss 1101 to 1104. 
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E Protection of Third Parnes 
A concern of third parties contracting with the LLC is whether the manager or 
member they are dealing with has the authority to enter the LLC into the proposed 
transaction. Operating agreements which may define the relative authority and duties 
of managers and members are not required to be filed with any state registrar and 
indeed may even be oral agreements in some states. Accordingly, third parties lack the 
means of independently verifying the authority of the person they are dealing with and 
instead require broad protection. 
Idaho and Colorado are two states that provide a clear codification of this protection 
in agency provisions. Idaho provides that every member of a member-managed firm is 
an agent of the LLC and any act by him or her for apparently carrying on in the usual 
way the business or affairs of the LLC binds the LLC, unless that member in fact has 
no authority for that action and the third party has knowledge of that fact. Knowledge 
is defined as actual knowledge or knowledge of other facts that in the circumstances 
show bad faith. Managers of a manager-managed LLC are similarly construed as 
agents of the LLC, although members are no longer considered agents solely by reason 
of being a member. Third parties need simply check the articles of organisation filed 
with the secretary of state to confirm whether they are dealing with a member or 
manager managed firm. Acts of a member or manager outside the "apparently carrying 
on in the usual way the business or affairs of the LLC" do not bind the LLC unless 
authorised in accordance with an operating agreement. 20 
Colorado's agency prov1s1on similarly provides that every act of a manager (or 
member in a member-managed firm) for apparently carrying on in the usual way the 
business of the LLC binds the LLC, unless that manager in fact has no authority for 
20 Idaho LLC Act arts 53-616 and 53-667. 
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that action and the third party has knowledge of that fact. 21 Again, the ULLCA agency 
provisions follow a similar form, but in addition to the actual knowledge proviso 
provides that a third party is deemed to have notice of the fact of any relevant 
restriction in the operating agreement where that person has "reason to know the fact 
exists from all of the facts known to the person at the time in question. "22 
F Members 
I Capital contributions and withdrawal 
Members may contribute capital in the form of cash or other property, prormssory 
notes, or services. Members are liable to the LLC for unreceived contributions, and 
any right given to other members to waive this liability may not affect the right of a 
creditor who extended credit or whose claim arose before the waiver. 23 
Subject to capital maintenance rules members are given a right to withdraw their 
capital upon the consent of all remaining members or upon the giving of notice and the 
following of the procedure outlined in the operating agreement. 
The member may remain liable to the LLC for a period following the return, to the 
extent of that returned contribution, for liabilities incurred while a member. In 
Wyoming, for example, members remain liable for 6 years. 24 In Colorado members 
remain liable for 6 years, but only if the contribution was returned in violation of the 
Act or the operating agreement. 25 The Colorado provision makes more sense. Where 
21 Colorado LLC Act art 7-80-406(4). 
22 ULLCA SS 102 and 301. 
23 For example sec the Wyoming LLC Act art 17-15-12l (c). 
24 Wyoming LLC Act art 17-15-12l(d). 
25 Colorado LLC Act art 7-80-607(2). 
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the return is subject to capital maintenance rules it seems unnecessary to impose a 
continuing liability rule as well . 
Failure by the LLC to return a members contribution when rightfully demanded often 
entitles that member to dissolve the LLC. 
2 Admission of new members 
Wyoming requires any right to admit new members to be included in the articles of 
organisation at formation. 26 Other states don't require the consideration of this issue at 
formation but protect the holdings of original members by providing for the admission 
of new members by the written consent of all members or in accordance with a written 
operating agreement . 
3 Transferability of interest 
The interest of members in the LLC constitutes personal property and may be assigned 
or transferred subject to any restrictions in the operating agreement The transferee 
gets an interest in the transferring member ' s share of profits and return of 
contributions, but may only participate in management or be admitted as a member 
upon the unanimous written consent of other members, or in some states as otherwise 
provided in the operating agreement. This restriction on the transfer of management 
rights to outsiders reflects the likelihood that as a closely held business the LLC will 
largely depend on the inter-personal dynamic of original members. 
The transferor generally remains liable to LLC for promised contributions and 
wrongfully received distributions. In the absence of contrary agreement the transfer of 
the interest may terminate the membership of the transferor27 or the transferor may 
26 Wyoming LLC Act art 17-15-107(vii). 
27 Delaware LLC Act art 18-702(2). 
continue as a member until the transferee becomes a member or the transferor 
· 28 resigns. 
G Dissolution 
Dissolution typically occurs upon the written consent of all members, when the period 
of duration expires or upon the happening of an event specified in articles of 
organisation or operating agreement, or upon the termination of member' s continued 
membership unless remaining members unanimously consent to continue or there is a 
continuance right included in the articles of organisation or operating agreement. 
Some states include provision for judicial dissolution. For example in Delaware a 
member or manager may apply for a judicial decree of dissolution where it is "not 
reasonably practicable to carry on business in conformity with a LLC agreement". 29 
Members of Idaho LLCs may apply for judicial dissolution where management is 
deadlocked and the LLC 's affairs are being irreparably harmed, or where the acts of 
managers or members in control of the LLC are illegal, oppressive or fraudulent and 
irreparable injury to LLC is being suffered or threatened.30 
Upon dissolution LLC assets are distributed first amongst creditors (including 
members who happen to be creditors), then to members in satisfaction of LLC 
liabilities for distributions, then to members in return of their contributions and finally 
the remainder to members in proportion to their interest in LLC profits and 
distributions. Operating agreements may generally vary priority among the members. 
28 ldaho LLC Act art 53-636( l )(d). 
29 Delaware LLC Act art 18-802. 
30 ldaho LLC Act art 53-643. 
15 
IV TRANSACTIONAL ANALYSIS 
In New Zealand the Companies Act 1993 sets out detailed procedural provisions for 
the regulation of most aspects of operating a company, requiring recurrent 
documentation and certification of management actions. This is in contrast to the 
general nature of the LLC which leaves much of its regulation to the agreement of the 
members and imposes very few if any documentation requirements. The minimalist 
nature of the Wyoming LLC Act makes a particularly strong contrast in this regard 
and will be used as the LLC legislation in this transactional analysis. 
The following analysis aims to highlight the comparative strengths and weaknesses of 
the different approaches of the two operating vehicles, in a transactional context, with 
the corresponding implications for their commercial practicability. 
A Formation 
A, B, and C join together to undertake a business venture. 
If the business is to be structured as a company then under s 11 of the Companies Act 
any one of them may apply for registration of the company by delivering a s 12 
application for registration to the registrar, containing the following information: 
( 1) consents, names and addresses of directors; 
(2) consents, names and addresses of shareholders; 
(3) number and class of shares to be issued; 
(4) notice reserving a company name under s 22; 
( 5) registered office and address for service. 
( 6) copy of the company' s constitution, if it is to have one. 
'-' • 
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Upon the receipt of a properly completed application the registrar issues a certificate 
of incorporation, which is conclusive evidence that all requirements for incorporation 
have been completed. Then under s 4l(a) the directors must issue the shares to A, B 
and C as detailed in the application. 
If A, B and C don't include a constitution the company will not be able to undertake 
certain transactions, in particular a purchase of its own shares, the issue of redeemable 
shares or the indemnification of directors and employees.
31 Some of these transactions 
may be undertaken by a s 107 unanimous agreement of all entitled persons, which 
would be A, B and C as shareholders in this example. 
32 These agreements may be 
adopted at formation or immediately prior to the transaction. Such an agreement is 
designed to enable the shareholders of a closely held company to avoid the procedural 
and documentary requirements of certain transactions, and the accompanying liability 
exposure of directors in case of their breach. 
However, any unarumous agreement to authorise a dividend, approve a discount 
scheme, acquire own shares, redeem shares, give financial assistance, or authorise 
director ' s remuneration or other benefits otherwise than in accordance with the 
provisions of the Act which would ordinarily govern those transactions, will be subject 
to fresh documentary and procedural requirements under the s 108 application of the 
solvency test. As will be seen below, the nature of the solvency test and the 
accompanying liability exposure of directors, combined with the s 107( 6) power to 
withdraw from certain unanimous agreements, may ironically make a s 107 unanimous 
31 Companies Act 1993 ss 59, 68, and 162 respectively. 
32 Section 2 defines an entitled person as: 
(a) a shareholder; and 
(b) a person upon whom the constitution confers any of the rights and powers of a shareholder 
For a closely held company major creditors such the overdraft providing bank will be in a strong 
bargaining position to require entitled person status as a condition of the ex-tension of credit. As an 
entitled person the bank would have standing to bring actions against the company and its directors 
prior to liquidation. See sections 164 and 17-1 . 
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agreement a less attractive method for closely held comparnes of adopting a 
transaction. 33 
Particular transactions will likely be of interest to A, B and C at the outset. The 
capacity of the company to purchase its own shares may be a handy distribution option 
and useful for personal liquidity purposes. The issue of redeemable shares will be 
necessary to implement a satisfactory back agreement (as will be seen below), and, 
although restricted, the indemnity provisions can be used to reduce A, B and C's 
liability exposure. These transactions should be authorised by the constitution or in a s 
107 unanimous agreement. 
Also, in the absence of a constitution the shares of A, B and C will be freely 
transferable to an outsider
34 and the board (which will constitute C if she is the sole 
director) will be able to freely issue shares, subject to a right of pre-emption given to 
the shareholders.35 To the extent that the transfer of shares to an outsider would 
undermine any inter-personal dynamic important to the operation of the business, or 
the issue of shares would threaten dilution of their holdings, A, B and C should restrict 
these powers in the constitution, for example by requiring the consent of shareholders 
for both actions. 
If A, B and C all want a direct say in management they should also include in the 
constitution a provision entrenching themselves as directors. This will prevent any two 
of them 'rolling' the other from the board by a s 156 ordinary resolution of 
shareholders. 
B See the following discussion on the implementation of buyout agreements and the pa)mcnt of 
directors remuneration under s 161 . 
34 See the rights that attach to a share under s 36, unless altered in the constitution. 
35 As explained in the admission of new members transaction this right of pre-emption under s 45 is 
of only limited value where the shareholder lacks the resources to take up the offer. 
M 
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As a Wyoming LLC any one of A, B or C may form the LLC by delivering copies of 
the Articles of Organisation to the Secretary of State for filing . 
Under s 17-15-107(a), amongst other things, the Articles of Organisation shaJI set 
forth : (I) the total capital contributions of the members and the times at which or the 
events upon the happening of which they shall be made; 
(2) the period of LLC duration (30 years in default); 
(3) any right to admit new members; 
(4) a vesting statement if management is to be by managers; 
(5) any continuance right upon the disassociation of a member; 
and may include any other provision contracted for by the members for the regulation 
of the internal affairs of the LLC. 
The Secretary of State then issues a certificate of organisation under s 17-15-108, 
which under s 17-l5-109(a) is conclusive evidence that the LLC is legally organised. 
If A, B and C file the bare minimum requirements they will have no right to admit new 
members, nor any right to vest management in managers, and the LLC will dissolve 
upon the disassociation of a member. No other powers or rights need authorisation in 
the articles of organisation. 36 By limiting the right of admission of new members, the 
Act automatically protects any inter-personal dynamic that is integral to the business.
37 
The articles of organisation may only be amended in accordance with the operating 
agreement or with the consent of all members. 
38 
36 Wyoming LLC Act art 17-15-107(b). 
37 Note also that under art 17-15-1 22 transferees of LLC interests may only become members upon 
the unanimous written consent of the remaining members. 
38 Wyoming LLC Act art 17-15-1 29(d). 
19 
In default A, B and C as members are directly involved in management, in proportion 
to their capital contributions.
39 This recognises that the greater convergence of 
ownership and control in a closely held business renders superfluous an artificial 
separation of ownership and control in a board of directors. In the extreme, such 
separation under the Companies Act is totally unnecessary for a one person company, 
rendering the procedural and documentary requirements aimed to ensure directors are 
accountable to shareholders, to the extent they can 't be avoided by provision in the 
constitution or unanimous agreement, a totally unnecessary expense. 
40 Although the 
Wyoming Act requires at least two members it is not an a necessary feature of the 
LLC as many other Acts permit single member LLCs. 
The bare minimum filing requirements of a Wyoming LLC are better suited to closely 
held companies than those of the Companies Act. Without the members doing more 
the LLC is given full powers to undertake any of the activities detailed in art 17-15-
104 and their interests are protected against the intrusion of outsiders and involuntary 
dilution. In contrast the Companies Act compels members of closely held companies to 
incur the expense of drafting constitutional provisions and unanimous agreements to 
provide similar powers and protection of their interests . The Companies Act would do 
better to permit own share repurchases, redeemable shares, and indemnification of 
directors and employees except where restricted in the constitution. The utility of free 
transferability of shares to larger companies warrants its retention. 
39 Wyoming LLC Act art 17-15- I I 6. Perhaps a better default allocation of management rights would 
be on a per capita basis, giving A B and C an equal say in the running of the LLC, as is seen for 
example in the ULLCA s 404. 
40 A company need only have one shareholder. Companies Act 1993 s 10. 
• 
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B Admission of New Members 
A and B wish to admit a fourth equal member to the business, D. C objects. 
A, B, and C are all directors of the company. As a company, in the absence of any 
constitutional restrictions, the board has the power under s 42, subject to the Act, to 
issue shares to any person and in any number. A and B control the board
41 and so are 
able to issue shares to D in accordance with sections 45 and 47 . Under s 45, as an 
existing shareholder, C has a pre-emptive right to the offer of shares, designed to 
prevent any involuntary dilution of her holdings. However, this pre-emptive right will 
be of no value if C lacks the resources to take up the offer. In addition, certain 
determinations and certifications concerning the adequacy of the consideration for the 
shares must be made by A and B as directors under s 4 7. If made carefully C won 't 
have any recourse against A or B for breach of duty under s 4 7. 
Clearly C' s protection under s 45 is limited . Not only must C have sufficient funds to 
make use of the pre-emptive right but also she will lack the protection of the s 117 
minority buy-out right, which doesn 't apply to issues of shares in accordance with s 
45 . 
To avoid these problems C should have insisted at formation that the constitution 
prohibit the issuing of shares. Then under s 44(1) 75% shareholder approval would be 
required before any issue could be made. In a three person company C would have 
41 Under s 160 the proceedings of the board are governed by the 3rd schedule. Under clause 5 a board 
resolution is passed by the majority vote of directors present at the meeting, provided a quorum exists 
(majority of directors). Under clause 7 in the absence of a meeting resolutions may be passed by the 
unanimous written agreement of directors. 
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negative control over the issue, controlling one third of the vote.
42 However, if there 
were more than three shareholders C would be wise to insist o
n the constitution 
requiring unanimous shareholder approval for any share issue.
 Such unanimous 
agreements could then be adopted under s 107(2) of the Act, avoidi
ng the expense and 
liability exposure of directors presented by the determinations
 and certifications 
required under s 4 7. 
In contrast, as members of a Wyoming LLC, A, B and C, are requi
red to consider the 
admission of new members at formation . If they wish to include such a righ
t then they 
must contract as to its terms and include it in the Articles of Organ
isation. It is likely 
that A, B and C will require their unanimous consent before the a
dmission of a new 
member. By requiring the members consideration at formation t
he Wyoming LLC 
ensures that C is not surprised later by any dilution in her sharehol
ding. 43 If a right to 
admit new members is not included in the articles of organisation th
ere is no right and 
C need not worry about her interest being involuntarily diluted b
y A and B in the 
future. Accordingly the Wyoming Act provides more effective
 and more direct 
protection for members against involuntary dilution of holdings. 
C Buyout Agreements 
A disagrees with the management policies pursued by B and C. A w
ishes to retire from 
the business. 
42 In a four person company C would lose this negative control. H
owever she "ould still have 
available the minority buy-out right ofs 117, which is preserved in th
e application ofs 44 by s 44(4). 
providing some incentive for shareholders to reach agreement on any
 issue. 
43 As a corollary to the admission of new members, under art 17-15-122 
the Wyoming Act also 
requires the unanimous written consent of members before any tr
ansferee of a LLC interest can 
participate in management. To achieve a similar result for a 1993 A
ct company A B and C could in 
the company constitution provide that voting rights attached to trans
ferred shares remain inoperative 
without the approval of other shareholders. 
\-1 
• 
:s::. 
• 
• 
22 
Under the Companies Act, without pnor provision for a buyout 
agreement, A has 
limited options for retiring and withdrawing his capital. In the absen
ce of any minority 
buy-out right arising under s 110
44 or under s 11 7
45
, A cannot compel the company to 
repurchase his shares. 
46 The only certain way A can retire from the business is by 
transferring his shares to a third party. Even then the constitution
 of a closely held 
company is likely to restrict share transfers to outsiders. To ensure h
e has a guaranteed 
exit mechanism with the required ex ante certainty A should con
tract for a buyout 
agreement at the time of formation, before any disagreement arises. 
Attempts to implement a buyout agreement via a company purcha
se of own shares, 
either pursuant to a right in the constitution and in accordance with
 sections 59 to 67 
or pursuant to a s 107 ( 1) unanimous agreement, will be complicat
ed by problems in 
achieving the desired ex ante certainty. 
Before the company can offer to purchase its own shares sections
 59 to 67 require 
resolutions as to the best interests of the company, and the fairness 
to the company of 
the consideration and terms of the offer.
47 The statute anticipates the passing of these 
44 Section 110 provides a buy-out right for those shareholders who vote
d against a special resolution 
passed in the exercise of shareholder powers under s 106(l)(a), (b), o
r (c) . 
45 Section 117 provides a buy-out right for those shareholders who vote
d against a special resolution 
passed to authorise the company to take an action altering that class o
f shareholder rights. 
46 Assuming here that they aren 't shares redeemable at the option of the
 shareholder. 
47 Under s 59(1), subject to the s 52 solvency test, the company ma
y purchase its O\m shares if 
e>rpressly permitted by its constitution. That share repurchase must t
hen be made in accordance with 
sections 60, or 63 , or 65 . At first glance s 60(1)(b)(ii) is the most 
likely means of implementing a 
buyout agreement. It provides for an offer to one or more shareholder
s with exl)ress permission in the 
constitution and in accordance with s 61 . 
Under s 60(3) the board must, before the offer, resolve with reasons th
at: 
(a) the acquisition is in the best interests of the company: 
(b) terms and consideration for the offer are fair and reasonable to the
 company: 
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resolutions immediately before making any offer to A for his
 shares.48 Consequently, 
although A may contract for the buyout right at the time of fo
rmation it may be years 
before its performance and the making of the offer, which is w
hen the resolutions will 
have to be made, and A will have no guarantee that the board
 will at that time resolve 
the offer to be in the best interests of the company. To ach
ieve the desired ex ante 
certainty any buyout agreement should only be dependent
 the satisfaction of the 
solvency test at the time of the shareholder's retirement, not
 any resolution as to the 
best interests of the company. 
Although A, B and C may avoid the resolution difficulties 
of sections 59 to 67 by 
adopting a buyout agreement under a s l 07 unanimous agree
ment, new difficulties in 
achieving ex ante certainty arise. The buyout agreement, by
 giving shareholders the 
option to require the company to repurchase their shares a 
some time in the future, 
makes it unlikely that the buyout agreement will be considere
d a particular exercise of 
power under s 107(5)(a). It is instead likely to fall within as 1
07(b) general agreement 
to exercise a power from time to time, in which case ex ante
 certainty is undermined 
by the subsection 107(6) power of shareholders to withdraw 
from such an agreement 
at any time. Subsection l 07( 6) is an extensive deviation f
rom the normal law of 
contract. 
The best option of A, B and C is to make provision in the con
stitution for the issuance 
of shares redeemable at the option of the shareholder, whic
h will achieve a similar 
(c) it is not aware of any material information undisclosed lo s
hareholders. 
Additional resolutions and reasons are required under s 61 , tha
t: 
(a) the acquisition is of benefit to remaining shareholders; 
(b) terms and consideration of the offer are fair to remaining s
hareholders. 
Under s 66 A's shares will be deemed cancelled immediately u
pon repurchase. 
48 A change in circumstances between the making of the resolu
tions and the acceptance of the offer 
requires fresh resolutions to be made. 
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result to a buyout agreement. 
49 Upon disagreement A may give the company the 
'proper notice' under s 74 requiring it to redeem his shar
es at a price that may be 
specified, calculated by a formula, or fixed by a qualified 
disinterested third party .so 
A's shares are then deemed cancelled on the date of redemp
tion.s 1 To avoid the entry 
of an outsider who may inherit the shares in the event of a sh
areholders death A, B and 
C should make the shares redeemable at the option of the
 shareholder or upon the 
shareholder's death. 
Unlike a purchase of own shares under sections 59 to 67, or
 107, payments made to A 
under such a redemption are not directly subject to the solve
ncy test. However, if they 
are made when its requirements are not satisfied and A does
n't receive the payments in 
good faith and without knowledge of the breach, or has
n't altered his position in 
reliance on them, then he will be liable under s 56 for the
 payments. 
52 As an active 
shareholder in a closely held business A is likely to have kn
owledge of any breach of 
the solvency test. So although the expense of directors res
olutions and certifications 
under the solvency test are avoided A still faces a very real li
ability risk if it is ignored. 
If the value of the redeemed share is payable by instalmen
ts, as is likely for a small 
business with limited cash, the Act accords A the status 
of an unsecured creditor . 
Although this priority is higher than that received as a cre
ditor under a purchase of 
own shares transaction there is no reason why A should not
 have the freedom to seek 
security for moneys owing on any redemption. 
53 
49 Shares redeemable at the option of the company are subject to
 similar resolution requirements as a 
purchase of own share, undermining ex ante certainty in any b
uyout agreement. Sees 69. 
5° Companies Act 1993 s 68. 
51 Companies Act I 993 s 74(1 )(b). 
5
~ Companies Act 1993 s 74(2)(b). 
53 Compare ss 74( l)(c) and 67. 
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The Wyoming LLC Act addresses the buyout concerns of A
 more directly. In default 
the Act gives A the right to withdraw his capital contribution
 without the consent of B 
and C, provided he gives 6 months notice
54
, and all liabilities of the LLC, except 
liabilities to members on account of their contributions to c
apital, have been paid or 
there remains property of the LLC sufficient to pay them.
55 The value of A's capital 
contribution will be that recorded in the articles of organisati
on, and in default will be 
returned in cash. For A to have the right to demand the retu
rn of specific property a 
statement to that effect must be included in the articles of org
anisation. 
56 
However, A must still resign as a member, which will dissolve
 the LLC under s 17-15-
123 unless there is right of continuance for B and C
 under the Articles of 
Organisation. 
57 A will remain liable to the LLC for 6 years for the amou
nt of his 
returned contribution, to cover any liabilities incurred while a 
member, if required. 
58 
Despite this right to withdraw capital under art 17-15-120 A, 
B and C may still wish to 
include a buyout scheme in the articles or organisation, a
lthough the LLC is not 
expressly given the power to purchase its own interests. 
59 Under such a scheme they 
could provide for a more elaborate price mechanism than sim
ply the recorded value of 
their contributions, taking into account the profitability of the
 business. They may also 
54 Or other notice as specified in the operating agreement, art l 7-
15-120(b)(ii) . 
55 Wyoming LLC Act art 17-15-120. 
56 Wyoming LLC Act arts 17-15-107 and 17-15-120(c). 
5
- WyomingLLC Act art 17-15-123. 
58 WyomingLLC Act art 17-15-12l(d). 
59 Under art 17-15-104(v) the LLC has the power to deal in inte
rests of ·other LLCs', but under art 
17-15-104(xiii) it also has · all powers necessary or convenient
 to effect any or all of the purposes for 
which the LLC is organised'. and under art 17-15-104(ii) th
e LLC may deal in and with personal 
property (a member 's interest being part of his personal prope
rty under art 17-15-122). Arguably the 
LLC has the power to enter a buyout agreement with A B and C t
o purchase their interests upon the 
giving of a specified notice. 
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avoid the capital maintenance and continuing liability ru
les. No provision is made for 
the cancellation of the interest. 
60 
The continuing liability for 6 years under the withdraw
al of capital provision of the 
Wyoming Act makes that provision less commercially p
racticable to A, B and C than 
the redeemable shares option under the Companies Act. 
This continuing liability rule is 
unnecessary given the capital maintenance rule of
 art l 7-l 5-120(a)(i) which 
adequately protects the interests of creditors. Any buyou
t agreements A, B and C may 
adopt in addition to this withdrawal right should also be 
subject to capital maintenance 
rules, as are own share repurchases under the Compa
nies Act. The Wyoming Act 
possibly hasn't anticipated the possibility of own inter
est purhases by a LLC as it 
makes no provision for the cancellation of such interests
 once acquired. Other states, 
for example Delaware, make express provision for an
 the cancellation of an own 
interest purchased by an LLC.
61 
Simple changes to both Acts would render more comme
rcially practicable options for 
the implementation of buyout agreements. Under the 
Companies Act the s 107(6) 
power to withdraw should be removed. If parties want 
this power they can contract 
for it. Also retiring shareholders should be given the free
dom to seek security for any 
redemption price owing. The continuing liability rule of
 the Wyoming Act should be 
removed, and express provision made for own intere
st repurchases by the LLC, 
subject to a capital maintenance rule. 
60 However, under art 17-15-122 a purchase of A's interest b
y the LLC won ' t confer any management 
rights on the LLC without the unanimous written conse
nt of B and C. Presumably the LLC \\<Ould 
simply hold any pro rata distributions on A's old intere
st for the benefit of B and C. There is no 
provision for the cancellation of the interest in this s
ituation, besides the withdrawal of capital 
provisions under art 17-15-120. 
61 Delaware LLC Act art 18-702. 
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D Management 
A, B and C decide that management of the
 business should be by C. C is concerned 
about matters such as remuneration, limits 
upon her authority, potential interference 
from A and B, and risk exposure for neglige
nce liability. 
As a company C may gain control over ma
nagement of the business either by being 
appointed the sole director or by being appo
inted the managing director with certain of 
the boards powers delegated to her under s 
130.62
 In the absence of a constitution it is 
then left to the Act to regulate the rela
tionship between C as director and the 
shareholders. 
The Act reserves to A, Band C as sharehol
ders certain powers. For example, under s 
106 C will have to seek the special reso
lution approval of shareholders for the 
adoption or alteration of a constitution, the
 approval of a major transaction, and the 
amalgamation or liquidation of the compan
y. Also, as director C may not cause the 
company to purchase its own shares, issue 
redeemable shares or indemnify or insure 
herself or any employee without express 
authorisation in the constitution, again 
requiring a special resolution of shareholde
rs to adopt any constitution. A and B as 
shareholders effectively have negative contr
ol over these transactions and may to this 
extent frustrate the management of C. More
 directly A and B as shareholders are able 
remove C and elect new directors by ordinar
y resolution. 
Many of these prov1s1ons empowermg sh
areholders appear non-displaceable. For 
example, during the start up phase C as ma
nager will be making numerous decisions 
which will likely involve major transactions
, for example securing bank loans, leasing 
premises, and buying equipment. A and B m
ay be happy to give C a free hand to do 
this, but the s 129 major transaction rule 
requiring special resolution approval is 
62 Under s 128 management is to be by the boar
d subject to any limitations of the Act or cons
titution. 
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technically non-displaceable.
63 However, A and B may accept shares with lim
ited 
voting rights with respect to major transactions
, effectively displacing s 129. The 
company will still have to go through the incon
venience and expense of calling a 
shareholders meeting or of adopting a written reso
lution in lieu of such meeting under 
s 122. 
In contrast, as a Wyoming LLC management vests
 in default in A, B and C as 
members, in proportion to their capital contributio
ns. 64 There is no further regulation 
of LLC management comparable to the non-d
isplaceable s 106 requirement for 
shareholder special resolutions for certain transacti
ons. A, B and C are given complete 
freedom to contract for particular manageme
nt structures, including election 
procedures.
65 Management may be vested in C as manager, th
e relative rights and 
duties of C as manager and A, B and C as mem
bers being left to the members to 
decide in the operating agreement. 
66 
As a director C ' s remuneration must be made in ac
cordance with s 161. 
67 That section 
requires disclosure in the interests register and a b
oard resolution that the contract for 
remuneration payments is fair to the company. D
irectors who fail to disclose or to 
provide reasonable grounds for the resolution will 
be personally liable for the payments 
except to the extent they can prove the makin
g of the payment was fair to the 
company at the time it was made.
68 They will also incur a criminal penalty under s 140
 
63 It is not possible to reduce the level required for a spe
cial resolution. sec s 2. 
64 Wyoming LLC Act art 17-15-116. 
65 Article 17-15-116 provides in default for annual el
ections of managers in accordance with the 
operating agreement where management has been ve
sted in managers. 
66 Wyoming LLC Act art 17-15-104(ix). 
6
- Section 161 applies even if C as a director receive
s her remuneration in a capacity other than as 
director, for example as chief executive. To avoid s 
161 C may decide not to become a director and 
rely on powers delegated under s 130. 
68 Subsection 161(5). 
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for non-disclosure, a fine of$ 10 000.
69 These disclosure and resolution requirements 
guard against directors of abusing their position
 and giving themselves inflated 
remuneration or other benefits. To the extent t
hat shareholders of closely held 
compames are also directors the disclosure an
d fairness requirements are less 
necessary. 
To avoid the unnecessary disclosure and fairness
 requirements, and the resultant 
exposure to liability for non-compliance, A, B and
 C may adopt a contract for C's 
remuneration by unanimous agreement under s 10
7(1). But then under s 108(1) the 
payments become subject to the solvency test, whic
h exposes C and other directors to 
a new liability risk. All directors who voted in fav
our will be liable under s 56 for 
payments made in breach of the test to the exten
t they are unrecoverable from the 
director who received the payment. 
70 
These problems are not encountered by a Wyoming 
LLC. The legislation is silent as to 
remuneration to member managers.
71 The LLC may freely contract for the payment of 
remuneration to C. Any potential liability C may face
 for self dealing is at common law 
only, which, as explained below, may be contractu
ally limited. To avoid the relative 
uncertainty of relying on common law remedies in t
he case of embezzlement by C, A, 
B and C could contract at formation for a proce
dure to be followed in setting a 
managers remuneration. For example, the operating
 agreement could provide that all 
remuneration contracts must be approved by membe
rs. 
69 The disclosure exemption prm,ided bys 143 only a
pplies to remuneration made in accordance ,,ith 
s 161. Ifs 161 is breached s 143 no longer applies 
and the directors will be liable for non-disclosure 
under s UO . 
'
0 Under s 108(4) if payment is made in breach of the 
solvency test then the proYisions of s 56 for the 
recovery of distributions will apply making the d
irectors personally liable to the company for the 
unrecovered amount. Failure to make the required c
ertifications under s 108(2) results in a penalty of 
a $5000 fine . 
'I The legislation does not prohibit the appointm
ent of a member as manager under a manager 
managed LLC. 
'-' • 
• 
• 
30 
As a director of a company C is exposed to extens
ive civil and criminal liability risk. 
This risk lies in the Companies Act's codification of
 certain specific and general duties 
owed by C as a director to the company and sha
reholders. The Act also provides 
. c. h . 72 
accompanymg eniorcement mec arusms. 
An example of a specific duty are the s 4 7 requirem
ents for C as a director to make 
certain determinations and certifications as to the 
adequacy of consideration for an 
issue of shares. Failure to do so is a criminal offence
 and carries a$ 5000 fine . General 
duties including those of acting in good faith, actin
g in what she believes are the best 
interests of the company, and exercising powers fo
r proper purpose, are contained in 
sections 131 to 137. 
The broad negligence liability of section 13 7 will
 be the most worrying for C. It 
requires directors, when exercising powers or perfo
rming duties, to exercise the care, 
diligence, and skill that a reasonable director
 would exercise in the same 
circumstances. In assessing this standard the nature
 of the company, the nature of the 
decision, and the position of the director and t
he nature of the responsibilities 
undertaken by him or her, may be taken into accoun
t, but without limitation of other 
possible factors . Given the words without limitatio
n any special skills C has may 
possibly be taken into account in assessing that 
standard, even though she hasn ' t 
assumed any additional responsibilities for their use
. This point has yet to be decided 
by the courts. 
Clearly C should be very wary before accepting an
y directorship. Even if C were to 
avoid a directorship and assume management of t
he company as an employee with 
certain powers delegated to her under s 130 she ma
y still be deemed a director for the 
exercise of those powers under s 126. 
72 Companies Act 1993 ss 164. 165. 169 to 174. 
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The general duties of C under sections 131 to 137 ar
e non-displaceable, although A, B 
and C may attempt to limit C's liability under the 
general duties by defining in the 
constitution the terms "best interests of the comp
any" under s 131 , and "proper 
purpose" under s 133 . However, any attempt to do s
o will likely be in contravention of 
s 162 which prohibits the company providing any ind
emnity or insurance for a director 
or employee except as provided in that section. Th
at section includes a bar on any 
indemnification for liability owed to the company, 
or liability arising in respect of a 
breach of s 131. Both the section 131 and 133 d
uties are owed to the company. 
Indemnity under the section includes the relief or ex
cuse from liability, which is what 
A, Band C would be seeking to do by limiting the ordinary 
meaning of the company' s 
best interests and proper purpose. 
The cover that s 162 does provide for C is very lim
ited. Under s 162(3) the company 
may, if expressly authorised by its constitution, indem
nify her for any costs incurred in 
any proceeding that relates to liability for any act 
or omission in her capacity as a 
director and in which judgment is given in her favou
r, or in which she is acquitted, or 
which is discontinued. 
Clearly this only provides limited comfort for C. She
 won't be covered if she loses the 
proceedings. 
Subsection 162(4) provides that a company may, ag
ain with the express authorisation 
of its constitution, indemnify C in respect of liabil
ity to any person other than the 
company for any act or omission in her capacity as a
 director, or costs incurred by in 
defending or settling any claim or proceeding relatin
g to any such liability, not being 
criminal liability or liability in respect of a breach of
 the s 131 duty. 
Again this provides only limited comfort for C i
n respect of duties owed to the 
company and to A and B. All but one of the general 
duties are expressly owed directly 
to the company, and therefore outside the scop
e of permissible indemnification. 
Although C may be indemnified for any liability ow
ed to A and B as shareholders, 
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many of the duties owed to shareholders, for exampl
e the duties under sections 90 and 
140, carry criminal penalties which are also ou
tside the scope of permissible 
indemnification. 
However, the subsection does enable the company t
o indemnify C for liability to third 
parties incurred while acting in good faith in purs
uit of the company' s interests (ie 
when not in breach of s 131 ), provided its not crimin
al liability. 
Under subsection 162(5) the company may, with 
the express authorisation of the 
constitution and the prior approval of the board, ef
fect insurance for C in respect of 
liability, not being criminal, for any act or omission
 in her capacity as a director, or 
costs incurred by her in defending or settling any cl
aim or proceeding relating to any 
such liability, or costs incurred her in defending any
 criminal proceedings in which he 
or she is acquitted. Although this subsection provid
es C with the possibility of wide 
insurance coverage in reality it will be nearly imp
ossible for C to contract liability 
insurance which substantially reduces her exposur
e. Typical liability insurance will 
contain exclusion clauses for liability arising in respe
ct of a breach by C of the Act. 
Despite the very limited nature of the indemnificatio
n and insurance available under s 
162 the practicable implications for C of her extensiv
e liability exposure may not be as 
worrying as they first appear. In a closely held com
pany the other shareholders will 
probably also be directors and therefore participating
 in the same board decisions as C, 
incurring substantially the same liability, and there
fore removing any real threat of 
litigation by them. 
The real threat to C arises if her mismanagement ren
ders the company unable to pay a 
statutory demand and the company is put into liq
uidation. Under s 301 both the 
liquidator and creditors may apply to the court
 for order requiring C to pay 
compensation to the company where she has been
 guilty of negligence, default, or 
breach of duty or trust in relation to the company. B
ut even then any action against C 
by the liquidator or the creditors themselves under s
 301 will most probably be against 
an already insolvent C. Major creditors of the comp
any would have sought personal 
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guarantees from A, B and C, the most common exa
mple being the personal guarantee 
for an overdraft . Thus C' s personal fortunes will be
 linked to those of the company. 
Even if C is solvent the company will probably ha
ve insufficient assets to fund any 
litigation by the liquidator. The creditors will be
 unlikely to fund any litigation 
themselves given its uncertain outcome and the losse
s already suffered by them. 
The Wyoming Act doesn't attempt to codify the gen
eral duties owed by C as manager 
to other members and the LLC, nor does it con
tain any enforcement provisions, 
leaving these things in default to determination a
t common law. However, wide 
powers to indemnify members and managers are gi
ven to the LLC under art 17-15-
104( xi) . That article gives the LLC the power, with
out more, to indemnify C against 
expenses actually and reasonably incurred in connect
ion with the defence of an action, 
civil or criminal, in which she is made a party by 
reason of being or having been a 
member or manager, except in relation to matters a
s to which she shall be adjudged 
liable to the LLC for negligence or misconduct in th
e performance of duty or to have 
received improper personal benefit in account
 of her position. Any other 
indemnification must effectively be authorised by th
e members, either by provision in 
the articles of organisation or the operating agree
ment, or by their adoption of an 
appropriate resolution. There has been no case law in
 Wyoming on this provision. 
In contrast to s 162, art 17-15-104(xi) clearly gives 
the A, Band C extensive freedom 
to contract for their own indemnification, overriding
 the public policy concerns which 
have historically limited the indemnification of corp
orate directors and employees at 
common law in the US
73
. In other US jurisdictions the paramountcy given to
 freedom 
13 The New York case of ,Vew York Dock Co v McCollu11
1 , 173 Misc. 106, 16 N.Y.S .2d 844 (N.Y Sup. 
Ct. 1939) is a leading early case in this area, and alth
ough widely criticised in other State 
jurisdictions, triggered a wave of State indemnificat
ion statutes for corporate directors and officers. 
See P. Walter "Statutory Indemnification and Insuran
ce Provisions for Corporate Directors - to what 
end?" [ 1988-89] 38 Drake Law Review 241. 
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of contract is even clearer. For example the D
elaware LLC Act provides in art 18-
108: 7
4 
Subject to such standards and restrictions, if a
ny, as are set forth in its limited liability comp
any 
agreement, a limited liability company may, a
nd shall have the power to, indenmify and h
old 
harmless any member or manager or other p
erson from and against any and all claims a
nd 
demands whatsoever. 
Clearly the Wyoming and Delaware LLC Acts h
ave taken a very different approach to 
directors duties and indemnification to that u
nder the Companies Act, giving the 
parties extensive contractual freedom rather 
than imposing what are essentially 
mandatory duties. 
Mandatory duties and the accompanying limits 
on indemnification may be justified by 
the presence of imperfect information and ex
ternalities. The small investor buying 
stock in a large corporation may face imperfect
 information as to the value of its that 
corporation' s constitutional provisions. Investor
s may lack the expertise, or incentive, 
to judge the implications of such provisions on c
orporate value, and the market may be 
inefficient in providing that information. Ma
ndatory corporation laws, of which 
directors duties are one branch, are a means of r
educing the information difficulties for 
the investor by providing a sure base of mandato
ry provisions for valuation. 
However, the imperfect information justification
 for mandatory directors duties is not 
strong when applied to closely held businesse
s due to the greater convergence of 
ownership and control. A, B and C are able to 
contract directly amongst themselves, 
each with the full information as to what they ar
e getting, and they should thus be able 
to contract freely for any indemnification by the 
company whatsoever. 
74 This provision 's displacement of the common la
w is reinforced by art 18-110 l (b) ,, hich provide
s: 
The rnle that statutes in derogation of the commo
n law are to be strictly constrned shall have no a
pplication 
to this chapter. 
35 
Any potential harm to the interests of creditors is not a sufficiently
 strong extemality 
of this freedom to indemnify to warrant the imposition of mandator
y duties and limits 
on indemnifications. 
75 As discussed above, the presence of personal guarantees and the 
expense of litigation once the company is in liquidation are lik
ely to render any 
mandatory directors duties largely worthless to creditors. 
Instead, the convergence of ownership and control in a closely held
 business, and the 
linking of personal and corporate fortunes through the prov
ision of personal 
guarantees, will provide a stronger incentive for managers to 
be careful in the 
management of the company than mandatory duties. Creditors ma
y still contract for 
their own protection, for example by the use of the debentures and r
omalpa clauses. 
In the context of closely held companies the contractual freedom of
 the Delaware Act 
with respect to indemnification is to be preferred over the restrictiv
e provisions of the 
Companies Act. 
75 To the extent that mandatory directors ' duties guard against reductio
n in company value through 
mismanagement they protect creditors interests, who of course will n
ormally have to satisfy their 
debts from the company' s assets given the limited liability of shareho
lders. The harm to these 
interests by indemnifying directors and removing the incentive for ca
reful management is not 
something taken into account by shareholders when entering such an indem
nification contract. It is 
therefore an ex1ernality of the freedom to do so. 
36 
V CONCLUSION 
The difficulties with the Wyoming LLC Act are easily re
medied, as is seen by 
reference to the Acts of other states. More generally, the L
LC offers a promising 
alternative to the Companies Act for closely held businesses. B
y separating control and 
ownership in a board of the directors the Companies Act 
puts in place a highly 
regulatory regime designed to ensure the accountability of di
rectors to shareholders. 
The convergence of ownership and control in a closely hel
d company renders this 
accounting unnecessary. Such documentary and procedural reg
ulation simply increases 
the transaction costs of doing business and expose the di
rectors to unwarranted 
liability risks. By recognising the identity of ownership and con
trol the LLC avoids the 
need for such regulation and provides much gggreater scope fo
r freedom of contract. 
Although the Companies Act, in s I 07, does go some w
ay in removmg these 
documentary and procedural formalities for closely held comp
anies, its effectiveness is 
clearly limited. Many are non-displaceable, for example the 
requirements to keep a 
share and interests register, to keep copies of board resolutions
, minutes and directors ' 
certifications, and the requirements to maintain and prepare
 certain accounting and 
financial records. 
76 
Also the minimalist company, the one without a constitution, 
is somewhat unsuited as 
an operating vehicle for a closely held business. Shareholders w
ill either have to adopt 
a constitution and or s I 07 unanimous agreements to achiev
e the same powers and 
protection of their interests as are typically provided in the min
imalist LLC. 
Rather than further tinkering with company law the needs of c
losely held businesses in 
New Zealand should be addressed directly by the adopt
ion of our own LLC 
legislation. 
06 Companies Act 1993 ss 90, 145, 189, 19-l. 
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